The aim of the thesis is to analyze, 10 years after the outbreak of the great crisis that marked the beginning of the century, what really were the causes of its beginning and to wonder if what had already happened could occur again. The 2008 crisis was undoubtedly a violent shock for America and for the whole world, causing consequences that have conditioned successive generations and their way of behaving for many years. The observers of the crisis have evoked specific responsibilities: from macroeconomic imbalances, which have allowed the accumulation of enormous amounts of savings, to the new financial model, which has allowed to divide and assemble loans in tranches with different risks to be sold to non-banks ; from the inclination to risk, which had spread due to the strong optimism and the high returns, to the rating agencies and to the behavior of the banks, too generous in assigning the judgment on the security of the credits, the first ones, and too inclined to grant loans to anyone who requested them, the latter; from the shadow financial system, which allowed the circulation of toxic tranches, to the inactivity of the supervisory authorities, which should have regulated the entire system and instead fell into a deep lethargy; from the irrational behavior of the users, with the desire to request mortgages that, probably, they already knew they would never have returned, to the collapse of property prices, which caused the bank run, panic sales, illiquidity and the collapse of the system. Finding precisely what was the first real cause of the great crisis is almost impossible, every motivation is closely linked to the others, but, without a doubt, the role of banks has been central to the extension of the global crisis. 2008 and all that came with it, with the stock market crash, the failure of the biggest American banks, the general illiquidity, taught a lot to the subjects, economic and not, who lived it up close, besides leaving an important lesson for future generations: the financial system is fragile. Now this lesson seems forgotten and therefore it risks to happen again given the cyclical nature of the story. Like the latter, the economy also follows cyclical patterns and tends to repeat itself, so it is logical to expect a future crisis even if it is difficult to predict when, but according to what great experts say, we still have a few years to do before this happens, and, in particular, to prevent it from happening. If we cannot accurately predict when a future recession will occur, we can certainly say that the relations between the great powers will play a fundamental role in a future, eventual, crisis, in particular America and China and the struggle of duties, which could raise the price of raw materials skyrocketing, with possible stock market crashes, in which, moreover, investors have returned to play on index volatility and bearish bets are at historic highs, a symptom of a new wave of optimism and erroneous perception of real risks, extra reasons of alert. Waiting for a turnaround, negative or positive, we just have the opportunity to rethink what happened at the beginning of the century and take the lesson, so that we can perceive early warning signals, so as not to be found unprepared and being able to backtrack in time, before history and catastrophe recur again.
Lo scopo della tesi è analizzare, 10 anni dopo lo scoppio della grande crisi che segnò l'inizio del secolo, quali furono davvero le cause del suo inizio e chiedersi se quanto già avvenuto potrebbe verificarsi di nuovo. La crisi del 2008 è stata senza dubbio una scossa violenta per lAmerica e per il mondo intero, provocando conseguenze che hanno condizionato le generazioni successive e i loro modo di comportarsi per molti anni. Gli osservatori della crisi hanno evocato precise responsabilità: dagli squilibri macroeconomici, che hanno permesso laccumulo di enormi quantità di risparmio, al nuovo modello finanziario, che ha permesso di dividere e assemblare i crediti in tranches con rischi diversi da vendere a soggetti non bancari; dallinclinazione al rischio, che si era diffusa a causa del forte ottimismo e degli elevati rendimenti, alle agenzie di rating e al comportamento delle banche, troppo generose nellassegnare il giudizio sulla sicurezza dei crediti, le prime, e troppo propense a concedere prestiti a chiunque li richiedessero, le seconde; dal sistema finanziario ombra, che ha permesso la circolazione di tranches tossiche, allinattività delle autorità di vigilanza, che avrebbe dovuto regolamentare lintero sistema e invece sono cadute in un profondo letargo; dal comportamento irrazionale degli utenti, con la smania di richiedere mutui che, probabilmente, già sapevano non avrebbero mai restituito, al crollo dei prezzi degli immobili, che ha causato la corsa agli sportelli, le vendite da panico, lilliquidità e il crollo del sistema. Trovare con precisione quale fu la prima vera causa della grande crisi è quasi impossibile, ogni motivazione è strettamente collegata alle altre, ma, senza dubbio, il ruolo delle banche è stato centrale nell'estensione della crisi a livello globale. Il 2008 e tutto quello che portò con sé, con il crollo delle Borse, il fallimento delle più grandi banche americane, lilliquidità generale, insegnò molto ai soggetti, economici e non, che lo hanno vissuto da vicino, oltre a lasciare un importante lezione per le generazioni future: il sistema finanziario è fragile. Ora questa lezione sembra dimenticata e rischia quindi di accadere di nuovo vista la ciclicità della storia. Come questultima, anche leconomia segue degli schemi ciclici e tende a ripetersi, è logico quindi aspettarsi una futura crisi anche se è difficile prevedere quando ma, stando a quanto affermano grandi esperti, abbiamo ancora qualche anno di tempo prima che questo accada, e, in particolare, per evitare che accada. Se non possiamo prevedere con precisione quando si verificherà una futura recessione, sicuramente possiamo affermare che i rapporti tra le grandi potenze giocheranno un ruolo fondamentale in una futura, eventuale, crisi, in particolare lAmerica e la Cina e la lotta dei dazi, che potrebbero far alzare il prezzo delle materie prime alle stelle, con possibili crolli delle borse, nella quali per di più gli investitori sono tornati a giocare sulla volatilità degli indici e le scommesse ribassiste sono ai massimi storici, sintomo di una nuova ondata di ottimismo e errata percezione dei rischi reali, motivi in più di allerta. Nellattesa che ci sia una svolta, in negativo o in positivo, non ci resta che la possibilità di ripensare a quanto successo a inizio secolo e cogliere la lezione, in modo da poter percepire in anticipo i segnali di allerta, così da non farci trovare impreparati e da essere capaci di fare marcia indietro in tempo, prima che la storia e la catastrofe si ripetano di nuovo.
Crisi del 2008: tra passato e futuro
BACHER, MONICA
2018/2019
Abstract
The aim of the thesis is to analyze, 10 years after the outbreak of the great crisis that marked the beginning of the century, what really were the causes of its beginning and to wonder if what had already happened could occur again. The 2008 crisis was undoubtedly a violent shock for America and for the whole world, causing consequences that have conditioned successive generations and their way of behaving for many years. The observers of the crisis have evoked specific responsibilities: from macroeconomic imbalances, which have allowed the accumulation of enormous amounts of savings, to the new financial model, which has allowed to divide and assemble loans in tranches with different risks to be sold to non-banks ; from the inclination to risk, which had spread due to the strong optimism and the high returns, to the rating agencies and to the behavior of the banks, too generous in assigning the judgment on the security of the credits, the first ones, and too inclined to grant loans to anyone who requested them, the latter; from the shadow financial system, which allowed the circulation of toxic tranches, to the inactivity of the supervisory authorities, which should have regulated the entire system and instead fell into a deep lethargy; from the irrational behavior of the users, with the desire to request mortgages that, probably, they already knew they would never have returned, to the collapse of property prices, which caused the bank run, panic sales, illiquidity and the collapse of the system. Finding precisely what was the first real cause of the great crisis is almost impossible, every motivation is closely linked to the others, but, without a doubt, the role of banks has been central to the extension of the global crisis. 2008 and all that came with it, with the stock market crash, the failure of the biggest American banks, the general illiquidity, taught a lot to the subjects, economic and not, who lived it up close, besides leaving an important lesson for future generations: the financial system is fragile. Now this lesson seems forgotten and therefore it risks to happen again given the cyclical nature of the story. Like the latter, the economy also follows cyclical patterns and tends to repeat itself, so it is logical to expect a future crisis even if it is difficult to predict when, but according to what great experts say, we still have a few years to do before this happens, and, in particular, to prevent it from happening. If we cannot accurately predict when a future recession will occur, we can certainly say that the relations between the great powers will play a fundamental role in a future, eventual, crisis, in particular America and China and the struggle of duties, which could raise the price of raw materials skyrocketing, with possible stock market crashes, in which, moreover, investors have returned to play on index volatility and bearish bets are at historic highs, a symptom of a new wave of optimism and erroneous perception of real risks, extra reasons of alert. Waiting for a turnaround, negative or positive, we just have the opportunity to rethink what happened at the beginning of the century and take the lesson, so that we can perceive early warning signals, so as not to be found unprepared and being able to backtrack in time, before history and catastrophe recur again.| File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12075/6049