In recent years, sustainability has become a central element of corporate strategy, evolving from a voluntary approach to an increasingly regulated paradigm through instruments such as the CSRD, ESRS, and SFDR. Within this context, ESG communication has assumed a strategic role, progressively shifting from a reputational tool to an integrated governance function. However, the intensification of environmental and social disclosures has generated distortive phenomena, most notably greenwashing, defined as the dissemination of misleading or selective information aimed at portraying a company as more sustainable than its actual performance would justify. At the same time, heightened regulatory scrutiny, reputational exposure, and legal risks have contributed to the emergence of a complementary yet opposite phenomenon: greenhushing. This refers to the deliberate reduction of ESG communication, even when substantial sustainability actions and investments are in place, in order to limit potential criticism, sanctions, or reputational backlash. The thesis examines the regulatory, reputational, legal, organizational, and strategic drivers underlying this behavior, highlighting how greenhushing represents not simple communicative inertia but a rational response to a context characterized by regulatory complexity and information saturation. Through theoretical analysis supported by empirical evidence, the study identifies the existence of an ESG communication paradox: excessive disclosure may generate distrust and reputational risk, while strategic silence reduces transparency and accountability. The thesis concludes by proposing a sustainability communication model grounded in proportionality, data centrality, double materiality, and governance integration, with the aim of overcoming the dichotomy between greenwashing and greenhushing and fostering credible, effective, and long-term oriented ESG communication.
Negli ultimi anni la sostenibilità è divenuta un elemento centrale nelle strategie aziendali, passando da approccio volontario a paradigma sempre più regolamentato attraverso strumenti quali CSRD, ESRS e SFDR. In questo contesto, la comunicazione ESG ha assunto un ruolo strategico, trasformandosi progressivamente da semplice leva reputazionale a funzione integrata di governance. Tuttavia, l’intensificazione delle comunicazioni ambientali e sociali ha generato fenomeni distorsivi, primo fra tutti il greenwashing, ovvero la diffusione di informazioni fuorvianti o parziali volte a costruire un’immagine sostenibile non coerente con le performance reali. Parallelamente, l’aumento dello scrutinio normativo, reputazionale e legale ha favorito l’emergere di un fenomeno opposto ma complementare: il greenhushing. Esso consiste nella riduzione intenzionale della comunicazione delle iniziative ESG, anche in presenza di azioni concrete e investimenti sostanziali, al fine di limitare rischi di contestazioni, sanzioni o backlash reputazionali. Il lavoro analizza le cause regolatorie, reputazionali, legali, organizzative e strategiche che alimentano tale comportamento, evidenziando come il greenhushing non rappresenti mera inerzia comunicativa, bensì una risposta razionale a un contesto caratterizzato da elevata complessità normativa e saturazione informativa. Attraverso un’analisi teorica e il supporto di evidenze empiriche, la tesi dimostra l’esistenza di un paradosso comunicativo ESG: l’eccesso di comunicazione genera sfiducia e rischio reputazionale, mentre il silenzio strategico riduce trasparenza e accountability. In conclusione, viene proposto un modello di comunicazione sostenibile fondato su principi di proporzionalità, centralità dei dati, doppia materialità e integrazione con i sistemi di governance, al fine di superare la dicotomia tra greenwashing e greenhushing e favorire una comunicazione ESG efficace, credibile e orientata al lungo periodo.
Effetti avversi dell'eccessiva comunicazione green: il fenomeno del Greenhushing
TITTARELLI, MATTIA
2024/2025
Abstract
In recent years, sustainability has become a central element of corporate strategy, evolving from a voluntary approach to an increasingly regulated paradigm through instruments such as the CSRD, ESRS, and SFDR. Within this context, ESG communication has assumed a strategic role, progressively shifting from a reputational tool to an integrated governance function. However, the intensification of environmental and social disclosures has generated distortive phenomena, most notably greenwashing, defined as the dissemination of misleading or selective information aimed at portraying a company as more sustainable than its actual performance would justify. At the same time, heightened regulatory scrutiny, reputational exposure, and legal risks have contributed to the emergence of a complementary yet opposite phenomenon: greenhushing. This refers to the deliberate reduction of ESG communication, even when substantial sustainability actions and investments are in place, in order to limit potential criticism, sanctions, or reputational backlash. The thesis examines the regulatory, reputational, legal, organizational, and strategic drivers underlying this behavior, highlighting how greenhushing represents not simple communicative inertia but a rational response to a context characterized by regulatory complexity and information saturation. Through theoretical analysis supported by empirical evidence, the study identifies the existence of an ESG communication paradox: excessive disclosure may generate distrust and reputational risk, while strategic silence reduces transparency and accountability. The thesis concludes by proposing a sustainability communication model grounded in proportionality, data centrality, double materiality, and governance integration, with the aim of overcoming the dichotomy between greenwashing and greenhushing and fostering credible, effective, and long-term oriented ESG communication.| File | Dimensione | Formato | |
|---|---|---|---|
|
Tesi_TittarelliMattia.pdf
accesso aperto
Dimensione
1.12 MB
Formato
Adobe PDF
|
1.12 MB | Adobe PDF | Visualizza/Apri |
I documenti in UNITESI sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12075/26010